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Abstract
During Lord Gordon Slynn’s period in office as the Advocate General at the European Court
of Justice (”ECJ” or “Court”) in Luxembourg, Lord Slynn delivered opinions in many significant
cases covering the whole range of European Communities (”EC”) competences, from cases concerning common agricultural policy and civil services to those concerned with the development
of the common market and the interpretation of the substantive law of the European Community.
Comments on Lord Slynn’s opinions in cases concerning the substantive law of the internal market
and on state aid cases have been published in other works. In this short Essay, the focus will be on
five selected opinions delivered by Lord Slynn in the field of competition and antitrust law, namely
the IBM, Pioneer, Hasselblad, Ford, and BAT cases.

SELECTED OPINIONS OF LORD SLYNN AS
ADVOCATE GENERAL
Rosa Greaves
INTRODUCTION
In 1981, Lord Gordon Slynn,1 then known as Sir Gordon
Slynn, became Advocate General2 at the European Court of
Justice (“ECJ” or “Court”) in Luxembourg. Lord Slynn
succeeded Jean Pierre Warner, the first Advocate General
nominated by the United Kingdom upon its accession to the
European Communities (“EC” or “Community”).3 During his
period in office, Lord Slynn delivered opinions in many
significant cases covering the whole range of EC competences,
from cases concerning common agricultural policy and civil
service to those concerned with the development of the common
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1. Sir Gordon Slynn was Advocate General from 1981 to 1988 and then became the
U.K. judge at the European Court of Justice (“ECJ” or “Court”). In 1992, he returned to
the United Kingdom and was appointed to the Judicial Committee of the House of
Lords, the highest court in the United Kingdom. Francis G. Jacobs, Justice: Some Personal
Reflections, in 1 LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY: JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW 17 (David O’Keeffe ed., 2000). From then on he was
known as Lord Slynn of Hadley.
2. The Advocate General is a unique feature of the ECJ. The Advocate General is of
equal status to an ECJ judge but does not participate in the deliberation of the
judgment. The Advocate General delivers an opinion to assist the judges in their
deliberations. The opinion officially closes the oral procedure of the hearing in a case
before the ECJ. Id. at 17–18.
3. The United Kingdom acceded to the then-three “European Communities”
(European Atomic Community, European Economic Community, and European Coal
and Steel Community) on January 1, 1973. Council Decision Adjusting the Instruments
Concerning the Accession of the New Member States of the European Communities,
O.J. L 2/1 (1973). There are currently eight advocates general, five of whom are
appointed by France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The other
advocates general rotate among the remaining Member States. Jo Hunt, The European
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, in UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN UNION
INSTITUTIONS 105 (Alex Warleigh ed., 2002).
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market4 and the interpretation of the substantive law of the
European Community.5 Comments on Lord Slynn’s opinions in
cases concerning the substantive law of the internal market and
on state aid cases have been published in other works.6 In this
short Essay, the focus will be on five selected opinions delivered
by Lord Slynn in the field of competition and antitrust law,
namely the IBM,7 Pioneer,8 Hasselblad,9 Ford,10 and BAT11 cases.
I.

THE IBM CASE

IBM v. Commission was important in establishing what actions
of the European Commission (“Commission”), when acting as a
competition enforcement agency, were subject to judicial review.
IBM lawyers challenged a statement of objections12 issued by the
European Commission at the end of its investigation as to
whether IBM had violated article 86 of the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community (“EEC Treaty”) (now
article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (“TFEU”))13 through conduct considered to be an abuse
4. The term “common market” was replaced in common usage in 1987 by the term
“internal market.”
5. Since December 1, 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the terms
“EC” and “European Community” have been replaced by the “EU” and “European
Union.” However, this Essay uses “EC” and the “European Community.”
6. See, e.g., Rosa Greaves, Judicial Review of Commission Decisions on State Aid to
Airlines, in 1 LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY, supra note 1, at
625; Pieter Verloren van Themaat, Some Opinions of Sir Gordon Slynn as Advocate General,
in 1 LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY, supra note 1, at 3
(Professor Verloren van Themaat was a colleague of Sir Gordon Slynn as Advocate
General from 1981 to 1986).
7. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Commission (IBM), Case 60/81, [1981] E.C.R. 2639.
8. SA Musique Diffusion Française v. Commission (Pioneer), Joined Cases 100–
03/80, [1983] E.C.R. 1825.
9. Hasselblad (GB) Ltd. v. Commission, Case 86/82, [1984] E.C.R. 883.
10. Ford of Europe Inc. v. Commission, Joined Cases 228–29/82, [1984] E.C.R.
1129.
11. BAT Cigaretten-Fabriken GmbH v. Commission, Case 35/83, [1985] E.C.R.
363.
12. The statement of objections sets out the evidence in support of the European
Commission’s conclusion that there has been a breach of the EC competition rules. The
undertakings concerned are given an opportunity to reply and to have an oral hearing
before a hearing officer who is an official of the Commission, but not a party to the
investigation. IBM, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, 2642.
13. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
arts. 101–02, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 88–89 [hereinafter TFEU]; Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community arts. 85–86, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
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of a dominant position within a substantial part of the common
market. The IBM lawyers challenged every procedural step taken
by the Commission.14 The ECJ agreed with the opinion of Lord
Slynn, which was richly documented with authority arising from
earlier case law.15 He argued that the procedural steps in the
European Commission’s investigation were purely preparatory
acts.16 He concluded they lacked legal effect as to the interests of
the undertakings concerned, and, therefore, were not “acts”
within the meaning of the EEC Treaty that would give rise to a
direct challenge from natural or legal persons.17 The statement
of objections laid out the Commission’s reasoned conclusion that
there was evidence to demonstrate that IBM had violated its
dominant position by abusive conduct and therefore was in
breach of article 86 of the EEC Treaty.18 The Advocate General
and the Court reasoned that only when the Commission issued
its final decision would IBM’s interests be affected.19 At that
stage, IBM could challenge the Commission’s decision before the
ECJ and raise any alleged procedural irregularities in respect of
the statement of objections.20
This was a very important case because it put an end to
attempts to frustrate the Commission’s competition procedures
by challenging each step in the process of investigating alleged
anti-competitive behavior. Furthermore, when the legal systems
of the EC Member States adopted similar competition law
models, these rules were incorporated into their national legal
systems;21 therefore, the opinion, and the confirming judgment,
not only influenced the development of EC competition law, but
also similar national laws.

[hereinafter EEC Treaty]. At the time when the cases mentioned in this Essay were
being considered by the European Commission and by the ECJ, the relevant European
Economic Community Treaty competition provisions were known as articles 85 and 86.
Since December 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty came into force, these articles have been
renumbered as articles 101 and 102, respectively. See The Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13,
2007, art. 5(1), 2007 O.J. C 306/1, at 134
14. IBM, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, 2642.
15. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, IBM, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, 2661.
16. Id. at 2663.
17. Id. 2664.
18. IBM, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, ¶ 2.
19. Id. ¶ 21; Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, IBM, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, 2667.
20. IBM, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, ¶ 25.
21. See, e.g., Competition Act, 1998, c. 41, §§ 1–24 (Eng.).
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II. THE PIONEER CASE
The Pioneer case concerned a Commission decision22
concluding that a concerted practice between several parties
breached EEC Treaty article 85 (now TFEU article 101).23 The
European importer of one of the world’s leading manufacturers
of hi-fi equipment and the exclusive distributors of these
products in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, were
alleged to have engaged in concerted practices to restrict crossborder trading by their dealers.24 Prior to this decision, the
criteria for determining the amount of a fine imposed on
undertakings for breach of the EC competition rules was mainly
based on the gravity and duration of the infringement and
amounted to a small percentage of the undertakings’ annual
turnover.25 The decision marked a change in the Commission’s
policy on fines given that the Commission calculated the fine in
this case primarily by reference to the annual turnover of the
undertakings concerned. Thus, this was an important case in the
development of the European Commission’s policy on
calculating fines to be imposed on undertakings found to have
breached the EC competition rules.26
The parties’ main argument was that the Commission had
failed, in the course of the administrative procedure, to disclose
the criteria upon which it intended to calculate the fine or to
inform the parties of the approximate amount of the fine that
the Commission was considering.27 It was at a much later stage
that the Commission announced the size of the fine, which
ranged between two-and-a-half and four percent of the annual
turnover of the undertakings concerned.28 This was a
considerably larger fine than those imposed in previous cases.29
The parties alleged that the unprecedented severity of the fines
22. Commission Decision No. 80/256/EEC, 1980 O.J. L 60/21 (Pioneer).
23. SA Musique Diffusion Française v. Commission (Pioneer), Joined Cases 100–
103/80, [1983] E.C.R. 1825, ¶ 1.
24. Id.
25. Id. ¶¶ 20, 101.
26. Although the case also involved matters of substance and procedure, the
analysis in this Essay relates solely to Lord Slynn’s opinion on the Commission’s policy
on fines.
27. Pioneer, [1983] E.C.R. 1825, ¶ 20.
28. Id. ¶ 103.
29. Id. ¶¶ 102–03.
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infringed the principle of equality of treatment given that no
advance notice of the change of policy had been given to the
parties and that in earlier decisions the Commission had
imposed lower fines on undertakings where similar
infringements had been established.30
Although Lord Slynn opined that the failure to set out the
criteria for imposing the fines in the statement of objections did
not vitiate the decision, he concluded that the parties were not
placed at such a disadvantage to warrant an annulment of the
decision.31 Furthermore, in his view, the Court itself had given
the parties full opportunity to comment on the manner in which
the Commission had set the fine.32 Nevertheless, Lord Slynn
commented that:
[w]here, however, the Commission proposes to take account
of a particular turnover in assessing a fine (as it appears to
have done in this instance) it is my view desirable that the
Commission should disclose that fact to the parties, in order
that they may ascertain that the correct turnover is being
used as a basis for the calculation. This is particularly
desirable where (as in this instance) the Commission itself
takes the view that the amount of the fine is ‘the real issue on
this case’ and that amount is, in aggregate, substantially
greater than the amount of any other fines imposed by the
Commission.33

Later in the opinion, Lord Slynn commented on the change in
the Commission’s policy and how that should have been
handled. Lord Slynn started by confirming this was a change of
policy—not one of powers—given that Regulation 17/62,34 the
procedural regulation governing the implementation of the EC
competition rules, permitted fines up to ten percent of the

30. Id.
31. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Pioneer, Joined Cases 100–103/80, [1983]
E.C.R. 1825, 1928.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Council Regulation 17/62 has been replaced by Council Regulation 1/2003,
but the provisions regarding of the total amount that the European Commission may
impose as a fine remain the same. Compare Council Regulation Implementing Articles 85
and 86 of the EEC Treaty, No. 17/62, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959–62, at 87, with Council
Regulation on the Implementation of the Rules On Competition Laid Down in Articles
81 and 82 of the Treaty, No. 1/2003, 2003 O.J. L 1/1.
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relevant turnover or one million European units of account,35
whichever was greater. He strongly supported the view that the
Commission should be free to impose the most appropriate level
of fines in each case and not be bound by precedent or a
requirement to give advance notice.36 He acknowledged that
fines may have to be increased as a deterrent, for example, where
particular practices become prevalent.37
Nevertheless, Lord Slynn concluded that when increasing
the fines, the Commission should have some regard for the level
of fines imposed in the past and that “it becomes particularly
important to consider the gravity and duration of the
infringement and its effects as well as the turnover.”38 He
accepted that a deliberate infringement with wide ranging effects
may well justify the maximum fine but this was not the case in
this situation, as the Commission itself had acknowledged.39
Thus, he concluded that the fine, particularly the one imposed
on Pioneer, was greater than was justified.40
Another interesting conclusion in this opinion relates to
what kind of turnover the Commission should take into account
when calculating the fine on the basis of turnover. Should the
turnover be by reference to all the markets in which the
undertakings operate or only those affected by the infringement?
Lord Slynn rejected the submissions of the parties that
“turnover” meant the turnover limited to a particular sector, as
this would prevent the Commission from being able to impose a
fine of sufficient size to amount to a real deterrent where a large
conglomerate, with diversified interests, was found to be in
infringement of the EC competition rules.41 Regulation 17/62
was clear that the fine can be imposed up to ten percent of the
undertaking’s total turnover.42 However, where the Commission
expressly states that it used the turnover as a basis for calculating
the amount of the fine to be imposed, then in Lord Slynn’s view,
35. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Pioneer, [1982] E.C.R. 1825, 1946. “Units
of account” refers to the European Currency Unit, the precursor to the Euro.
36. Id. at 1946–47.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1947.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1949.
42. Id. at 1949–50.
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the Commission should take account of the extent to which the
undertaking’s activities are diversified.43 Thus where an
undertaking has committed an infringement in only a small
sector of its activities, this is likely to be a less grave infringement
than if it had taken place in the whole of its activities. In
Pioneer’s case, Lord Slynn concluded that the Commission had
been wrong in calculating the fine on the undertaking’s global,
rather than European turnover.44
Given that Regulation 17/62 did not expressly restrict the
Commission’s authority to levy fines up to ten percent of the
annual turnover, the Court could easily have followed the
Commission’s interpretation that it was competent to impose a
fine based on global turnover. In what was a novel issue for the
Court, however, it followed the advice of the Advocate General.
III. THE HASSELBLAD CASE
In the Hasselblad case, the ECJ reviewed a Commission
decision45 which had found that a concerted practice existed
between a Swedish company which manufactured cameras
(Hasselblad cameras) and six of its sole distributors in violation
of EEC Treaty article 85(1) (now article 101(1) TFEU).46 One of
the undertakings concerned was a British company that sought
annulment of the decision.47 The ECJ reduced the fines
substantially, as the Commission had been unable to show that
cameras which were the subject of parallel imports had to wait
longer for repairs with the applicant than did the same cameras
in other Member States.48 Thus this conduct could not be
regarded as restricting the supply of parallel imports.49 In
reaching this conclusion, the ECJ no doubt was helped by the
detailed analysis of the facts and evidence carried out by
Advocate General Slynn.
Advocate General Slynn concluded that that the applicant
could not rely on the protection from fines under article 15(6) of
43. Id. at 1950.
44. Id.
45. Commission Decision No. 82/367/EEC, 1982 O.J. L 161/18, at 34
(Hasselblad).
46. Hasselblad (GB) Ltd. v. Commission, Case 86/82, [1984] E.C.R. 883, ¶ 20.
47. Id. ¶ 1.
48. Id. ¶¶ 34, 57.
49. Id.
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Regulation 17/62 given that the proven concerted practice
operated outside the sole distribution agreement which had been
notified50 to the European Commission.51 This was so even
though the notified agreement did include a prohibition on
exports outside the contract territory. Then he proceeded to
analyze the evidence and concluded that it had not been
established that parallel imported cameras were discriminated
against unlawfully.52 The opinion is a good illustration of the
assistance that the Advocate General can give the Court by acting
like a first instance judge and evaluating the evidence in a direct
action before the ECJ where the parties seek judicial review of a
Commission decision.
IV. THE FORD CASE
The Ford case was an important case in determining the
scope of the European Commission’s powers when issuing an
interim decision while carrying out an investigation. The
Commission had ordered Ford to continue supplying right-handdrive cars from its production line to customers in Germany53
while investigating whether a notified selective distribution
agreement was incompatible with EEC Treaty article 85(1) and, if
so, whether it could benefit from an article 85(3) exemption.54
The main contention was that the European Commission
had no competence to issue an interim decision requiring an
undertaking to take a particular step which could not be
50. Until 2004, there existed a centralized system that required firms to notify the
Commission of any concerted practices and agreements whose clauses restricted
competition. See Council Regulation No. 1/2003, 2003 O.J. L 1/1, at 1.
51. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Hasselblad, Case 86/82, [1984] E.C.R. 883,
927.
52. Id. at 931.
53. Commission Decision No. 82/628/EEC, 1982 O.J. L 256/20.
54. Until the modernization of the enforcement of the EU’s competition rules,
only the European Commission had the competence to decide that a notified
agreement that is incompatible with ECC Treaty article 85(1) (which became article
81(1) EC Treaty and now TFEU article 101(1)) could be exempted as it fulfilled the
conditions of ECC Treaty article 85(3) (which became article 81(3) EC Treaty and now
TFEU article 101(3)). Thus, an anti-competitive agreement could be granted an
“exemption,” often for a definitive period of ten years. Since 2004, the notification
system has been abolished and now it is for the parties and their legal advisers to
evaluate the agreement as to its compatibility with article 101 TFEU as a whole. Thus an
agreement that is incompatible with article 101(1) TFEU may now be “excepted” under
TFEU article 101(3) if it meets the conditions of this provision.
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required in the final decision.55 The European Commission
could make an article 101(3) exemption conditional on a certain
specific action being taken by the undertaking concerned, but it
could not order the undertaking to take the action.56 Thus the
question for the ECJ was whether the Commission could order in
an interim decision something which the Commission could not
order in a final decision.57
Advocate General Slynn was quite clearly of the view that:
Although an order may be different in form in an interim
decision from a final order, what is ordered must not exceed
in substance what the Commission could do in a final order.
There may be situations where the distinction is not entirely
clear, but it seems to me to flow from the ancillary nature of
interim relief, ancillary that is to the limited powers
conferred on the Commission.58

He also analyzed other grounds for the annulment of the
interim decision and concluded that the interim decision should
be annulled “on the grounds that it was not within the
Commission’s competence, was not ‘indispensable’ or
‘conservatory’ and was not supported by a sufficiently clear case
in law.”59
The ECJ followed the reasoning of the Advocate General
and annulled the Commission’s decision.60
V. THE BAT CASE
The last opinion to be considered concerns the relationship
between the EC Treaty rules on competition and on the free
movement of goods with regard to the protection of industrial
and commercial property. As stated in the Introduction, Lord
Slynn’s contribution to the development of the substantive law of
the internal market was particularly significant. In the BAT case
the opportunity arose for him to comment on this relationship
within the context of a delimitation agreement between two
55. Ford of Europe Inc. v. Commission, Joined Cases 228-29/82, [1984] E.C.R.
1129, ¶¶ 15–16, 19–21.
56. Id. ¶ 22.
57. Id. ¶ 17.
58. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Ford, [1984] E.C.R. 1129, 1169–70.
59. Id. at 1172.
60. Ford, [1984] E.C.R. 1129, ¶ 17.
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trademark owners. The case concerned an agreement between
BAT, a German manufacturer, and Segers, a small Dutch tobacco
producer. Segers owned a trademark “Toltecs Special” and was
threatened by BAT for violation of its own trademark
“Condorcet” on the ground it caused confusion in the German
market.61 In order to avoid expensive litigation, they entered into
an agreement restricting Segers’ potential use of its trade mark in
Germany and preventing Segers from challenging BAT’s right to
use its own trademark even after the expiration of the
trademark’s legal validity.62 Delimitation trademark agreements
were common in Germany and were considered not to violate
competition law, including EEC Treaty article 85, which prohibits
agreements restricting competition.63
Lord Slynn’s opinion made it clear that such agreements
were prohibited by article 85(1) since the objective was to divide
up the common market. Since the agreement did not fulfil the
conditions of article 85(3), it could not be “exempted.”64 The
ECJ agreed with the conclusions of Lord Slynn.65
CONCLUSION
Lord Slynn became an Advocate General at a time when the
European Community was emerging from a decade of legislative
inactivity in the 1970s. During that period the ECJ alone seemed
to have kept the European dream alive by delivering significant
rulings and judgments in the fields of competition and free
movement of goods.66 During his seven years in office, Lord
Slynn witnessed a complete change of political will with the
European Union’s adoption of almost 300 proposals for
legislation which would ensure that an internal market would
become a reality by December 31, 1992. However, the legislative
reform or modernization of the EC competition rules did not

61. BAT Cigaretten-Fabriken GmbH v. Commission, Case 35/83, [1985] E.C.R.
363, ¶¶ 7–8.
62. Id. at ¶ 11.
63. Id. at ¶ 33.
64. Id. at 372.
65. BAT, [1985] E.C.R. 363, ¶ 41.
66. See supra notes 7–11.
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take place until 2004,67 and therefore the development of EC
competition law was very much in the hands of the Court. The
competition law opinions mentioned above assisted the ECJ in
strengthening the EU’s legal order and ensuring that the EU’s
competition law regime developed in a robust and fair manner.
The opinions in these cases concerned issues of competence
both in relation to substantive law (BAT, Ford, Hasselblad, and
Pioneer)68 and procedural law (IBM).69
Although it is outside the scope of this Essay to discuss Lord
Slynn’s wider contribution to the development and acceptance of
EC law by national courts and judges, I cannot avoid making a
general observation. I would not be surprised if a future
evaluation of Lord Slynn’s role in the development of EU law
does not conclude that his most significant contribution was after
his return to the United Kingdom. As a member of the highest
court in the United Kingdom, the Judicial Committee of the
House of Lords, Lord Slynn was in an ideal position to influence
the acceptance of EU law as part of the domestic law of the
United Kingdom and to encourage his brethren to make
references to the ECJ seeking interpretation of EU law. But
perhaps even more significant may be the role he played in
helping to inform, train, and encourage judges, academics, and
students from Eastern Europe to embrace EC law.

67. See Council Regulation on the Implementation of the Rules On Competition
Laid Down in articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, No. 1/2003, art. 45, 2003 O.J. L 1/1, at
25.
68. See cases cited supra notes 8–11.
69. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Commission (IBM), Case 60/81, [1981] E.C.R. 2639.

